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Abstract
Rising feed-in from renewable energy sources decreases margins, load factors, and thereby
profitability of conventional generation in several electricity markets around the world.
At the same time, conventional generation is still needed to ensure security of electricity
supply. Therefore, capacity markets are currently being widely discussed as a measure to
ensure generation adequacy in markets such as France, Germany, and the United States
(e.g., Texas), or even implemented for example in Great Britain.
We develop a dynamic capacity investment model to assess the effect of different capac-
ity market design options in three scenarios: 1) no capacity market, 2) a capacity market
for new capacity only, and 3) a capacity market for new and existing capacity. We compare
the results along the three key dimensions of electricity policy—affordability, reliability,
and sustainability. In a Great Britain case study we find that a capacity market increases
generation adequacy. Furthermore, our results show that a capacity market can lower the
total bill of generation because it can reduce lost load and the potential to exercise market
power. Additionally, we find that a capacity market for new capacity only is cheaper than
a capacity market for new and existing capacity because it remunerates fewer generators
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1. Introduction
Conventional electricity generation is increasingly unprofitable in several European
markets. The major reason is that increasing feed-in from renewable energy sources (RES)
decreases revenues of conventional generation through decreasing electricity prices and
load factors—often referred to as the merit order effect of renewable energy (Sensfuß et al.,
2008). At the same time, conventional generation is still needed to ensure security of
supply due to the intermittency of RES. This challenge currently leads to a resurgence
of the discussion around capacity mechanisms as a suitable measure to ensure generation
adequacy1.
Renewable energy is growing in major markets worldwide. It has reached a share of
total electricity generation of 11% in Great Britain, 13% in the U.S., and 22% in Germany
in 2012. Most important in terms of renewable capacity growth are intermittent sources,
namely wind (onshore and offshore) and solar photovoltaic (PV). An essential characteristic
of these sources is that the total cost is almost entirely driven by capital costs and that
marginal costs are close to zero. As a consequence, in an energy-only market, RES push
conventional generation out of the money, if they are available. Hence, the load factors
of conventional generators decrease, along with average wholesale electricity prices2, and
generators become unprofitable. In 2012 for example, gas-fired generation was unprofitable
in Germany, France, and the Netherlands, while it was only barely profitable in Great
Britain (Bloomberg, 2013a; Platts, 2013; Reuters, 2013).
Due to the intermittency of RES however, these sources are not able to fully replace
conventional generation3. Moreover, studies of VDE (2012) show that the need for conven-
tional generation capacity stays almost unchanged with rising levels of feed-in from RES.
They find that the required conventional peak capacity stays the same with increasing re-
newable feed-in, only the need for energy from conventional generation decreases (in terms
of power generated).
The contradiction between lower profitability of conventional generation, which causes
1Additionally, there are other factors creating fear of capacity shortage and therefore reinforcing the
discussion: 1. Several large power plants that were built during the 1970s and 1980s have reached the end
of their economic lifetime and are scheduled to be retired; 2. Coal fired power plants are soon to be forced
out of the market due to the EU large combustion plant directive (EU, 2001) 3. In Germany, all nuclear
power plants are scheduled to be decommissioned by 2022 at the latest (German Federal Government,
2011).
2(short- and medium-term)
3As long as there is no cost-efficient grid scale storage for electricity available.
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investors to stay away from new investment, and continuously high demand for reliable
capacity puts generation adequacy at risk. Different capacity mechanisms have been dis-
cussed to ensure supply adequacy. The three most important ones are strategic reserves,
capacity payments, and capacity markets. What distinguishes the three schemes most
clearly is the question of who sets the price of capacity and who sets the quantity that is
being supplied: a strategic reserve is realized through the regulator determining system
critical power stations and paying these specific plants the fixed costs necessary to keep
them available for times of capacity shortage. In contrast to that, a capacity payment is a
market-wide fixed price set by the regulator, while the quantity is subsequently determined
by the market (the market will determine how much capacity is profitable to be supplied
at the given price). A capacity market reverses the logic of a capacity payment as the
regulator sets the quantity necessary for generation adequacy and auctions that quantity
in the market. Hence, the market sets the price that is required to provide the quantity
needed to fulfill generation adequacy needs. Additionally, the schemes differ in terms of
market clearing: with strategic reserves, the regulator pays for capacity of selected gen-
erators only4. In a capacity payment scheme, all generators receive a fixed payment per
MW installed. Whereas in a capacity market, the regulator auctions the capacity needed
for generation adequacy annually. From their design, some benefits and downsides of each
mechanism can easily be detected: strategic reserves are a very flexible measure that can
be adjusted quickly by the regulator, but the existence of strategic reserves distorts price
signals in periods of shortage—i.e., hindering investment in new capacity. A capacity pay-
ment allows for the option of different payments per technology but bears the risk that
setting the price too low or too high leads to a lack of capacity or to overcapacity. The
capacity market is most focused towards fulfillment of the regulator’s goal to ensure the
required capacity at the lowest possible price. On the downside, it significantly increases
market complexity because it introduces an additional market that is interdependent with
the electricity market. Our brief qualitative discussion shows that there are differences
between these policy schemes and that all of the schemes exhibit individual strengths and
weaknesses. Hence, it is not obvious what the effects of the introduction of such a mech-
anism are in a specific case. Therefore, we enrich the qualitative discussion by a model
4Selection is mostly done by location, i.e., if a plant is located in a region of shortage, or by profitability,
i.e., if a plant would be unprofitable without a strategic reserve payment.
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to quantify the expected effects in the specific market where the mechanism might be
introduced.
All schemes are in use in some markets5, but the current regulatory discussion is mostly
focused on capacity markets: examples are the U.K. where a capacity market is currently
in the process of legislation and implementation and the discussions in France, Germany,
and Texas. Therefore, we focus on the capacity market scheme to facilitate this discussion
through a quantification of effects of different capacity market design options on market
prices and generation mixes. To the best of our knowledge, the paper is the first to
quantify the difference between three scenarios: 1) an energy-only market, 2) a capacity
market for new capacity only and 3) a capacity market for new and existing capacity
through a dynamic capacity investment model. We apply this model in a GB case study to
show its practicality in a case where exactly these policy decisions are currently discussed.
At the same time, we set up the model in a way that it could easily be transfered to
any other market as well. The findings are of value to three groups. First, regulators
discussing the introduction and the possible effects of a capacity market scheme in their
market. Second, investors planning to invest in markets with such a scheme6. Third, all
other market participants such as grid operators, equipment manufacturers, and utilities
evaluating possible future regulatory impact.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief
overview of the literature regarding capacity mechanisms in liberalized electricity markets
in general, of qualitative discussions of capacity markets, and of quantitative simulation and
capacity expansion models. Section 3 describes our capacity investment model. In Section
4, we present the assumptions and results of our GB case study. Section 5 provides general
policy recommendations that can be derived from our findings, while Section 6 concludes
and provides suggestions for further research.
2. Literature review
Two streams of literature are important as the foundation to our research. First, the
literature around capacity mechanisms in liberalized electricity markets in general and
5Strategic reserves exist in Finland, Germany, and Sweden; Capacity payments in Ireland, Portugal, and
Spain; Capacity markets in several markets in the U.S.—e.g., in the PJM (Pennsylvania-Jersey-Maryland
Interconnection) and in New England.
6Either already implemented or in regulatory discussion.
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of capacity markets in particular, and second, modeling techniques such as quantitative
project valuation, market simulation and capacity expansion models.
Capacity mechanisms—especially capacity markets—in liberalized electricity markets. Gen-
eration adequacy and capacity mechanisms have been discussed in the literature for many
years. Oren (2005) and Hogan (2005) state that capacity mechanisms should not be nec-
essary in a liberalized electricity market because generators should be able to balance
their expenditures through bidding higher than marginal costs in hours of supply short-
age. However, they argue that market imperfections such as price caps and other market
power mitigation interventions can suppress this effect—even though it is required for the
functioning of the energy-only market. Cramton and Stoft (2005) and Joskow and Tirole
(2007) emphasize that there will always be imperfections in the energy-only market lead-
ing to, e.g., price spikes and exercise of market power, because the demand side does not
actively participate in the market and conclude that there is a need for a different market
scheme with the goal to ensure generation adequacy, e.g., a capacity market. In line with
that, Cramton and Stoft (2005) describe how a capacity market should be designed to
ensure adequate capacity while reducing the market power. They argue that, if designed
sensibly, a capacity market can ensure generation adequacy while eliminating much of the
potential to bid strategically. Baldick et al. (2005) provide a survey on the field of designing
efficient generation markets. They emphasize that many arguments mentioned by Oren
(2005), Cramton and Stoft (2005) are valid, but specific market design options require
more testing through quantitative models such as equilibrium models, sophisticated dy-
namic models and agent-based modeling. Cramton et al. (2013) argue that RES aggravate
the adequacy problem because they can be seen as entirely price-inelastic negative demand
(due to marginal costs close to zero). Through this characteristic, RES intensify demand
fluctuations and thereby price fluctuations. They add that with rising RES feed-in, con-
ventional investments—due to lower load factors—get less attractive. In this situation,
according to their argumentation, increased market coordination—e.g., through a capacity
market scheme—is necessary. Whether or not to pay existing generation when introducing
a capacity market, Cramton et al. (2013) state that all generation should be paid because
an energy-only market would also pay all generation. They reason that the strategy of
not paying existing generation7 might work once, if investors are surprised but afterwards
7Which they also call a regulatory taking or expropriation.
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would lead to investors requiring additional protection from future unequal treatments and
a risk premium. Hence, there is no clear consensus to be derived from a purely qualitative
assessment. Therefore, we follow the suggestion of Baldick et al. (2005) and quantitatively
analyze the effects entailed by the introduction of capacity markets.
Quantitative project valuation, market simulation and capacity expansion models. Three
major groups of models are used in the existing literature to assess long-term electric-
ity capacity investments and to address policy questions regarding generation adequacy
(Ventosa et al., 2005). First, single project valuation models that consider a certain type
of investment in detail but simplify market feedback—e.g., real options valuation. Sec-
ond, capacity expansion models that determine competitive market equilibria8. And third,
dynamic capacity investment models that include market feedback, often strategic behav-
ior and approximate future market developments through methods such as Monte Carlo
simulation.
Single project valuation models. Fuss et al. (2012) use a real options analysis to assess
the effect of uncertainty on investments in alternative energy technologies at a plant level,
which allows them to derive optimal technology portfolios for low emissions targets. The
results suggest that investors will focus on robust technology mixes that are most likely
to perform well also under the undesirable scenarios. Boomsma et al. (2012) analyze
investments in wind park projects under different renewable energy support schemes, such
as feed-in tariffs (FiT) and renewable energy certificates (REC). They find that FiTs lead
to earlier investment, while a REC market leads to larger project sizes. Hach and Spinler
(2014) also use a single project real options approach to assess the impact of capacity
payments on investments in gas-fired generation. They find that capacity payments are
especially important with increasing levels of intermittent feed-in from RES, as renewables
lead to lower load factors of gas-fired generation.
Single project valuation models allow to model specific investments and the particular
characteristics of a certain technology. This type of model lacks, however, market feedback
and technology competition. Therefore, we can make use of the results for comparative
purposes, but for the model we rather focus on a methodology that is capable of reflecting
market feedback such as the following two methods.
8Which are equivalent to the cost optimal solution under the assumption of perfect information and
perfect competition (Hobbs, 1995).
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Capacity expansion models. Hobbs (1995) describes an early form of a capacity expansion
model using a mixed integer linear program. The model is capable of finding an optimal so-
lution as a cost-optimal market outcome while ignoring rate-feedback (i.e., price elasticity)
and uncertainty. MARKAL (acronym for MARKet ALlocation) (Fishbone and Abilock,
1981; Loulou et al., 2004) is a more sophisticated linear programming model for energy
system analysis9. The primary objective of this project was to build a tool that allows
evaluating the role of new technologies in energy systems. MARKAL provides a modeling
environment with a long list of features: plant shut-down (scheduled and unscheduled),
hydro and pumped hydro representation, fuel processing, combined heat and power, to
name just a few. The model has been used for energy system modeling in more than 20
countries as well as by the European Commission and the International Energy Agency.
However, MARKAL does not account for strategic bidding and price elasticity since its ob-
jective function is cost minimization, neither does it account for ramping constraints since
it is a time-collapsed model—not allowing for a granular hour-by-hour evaluation. Ehren-
mann and Smeers (2011) formulate a capacity expansion model as a stochastic equilibrium
model to assess capacity investments under different risk attitudes with and without ca-
pacity markets. With regards to capacity markets they find that risk aversion decreases
capacity investments compared to risk-neutrality in an energy-only market with a low price
cap.
Capacity expansion models are well suited to reflect market feedback and technology
competition through the optimization approach—the solutions represent a market equi-
librium. However, due to the complexity of the optimization itself, this type of models
lacks—in most cases—one or more of the following features: ramping constraints, strategic
bidding, and price elasticity.
Dynamic capacity investment models. Day and Bunn (2001) provide a computational ap-
proach to incorporate strategic bidding in competitive electricity markets. They simulate
generation companies with profit maximizing behavior and their competition using supply
functions. They find that in the 1999 divestment proposal of the regulatory authori-
ties in England and Wales, the level of market power was underestimated. Bunn and
Oliveira (2008) develop an evolutionary agent-based computational approach to assess the
9Including primary energy flows and consumption in the heating and transportation sector. Hence, it
is not only focused on the power sector like all other models discussed here.
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dynamic strategic evolution of generation portfolios under regulatory interventions. They
use a Cournot representation of the wholesale electricity market and an iterative plant
trading game. The authors find that a minimum generation requirement, enforced for
example through a capacity market, limits the ability of market participants to exercise
market power. Powell et al. (2011) provide a comprehensive stochastic simulation model
based on approximate dynamic programming. The model aims to facilitate the multi-scale
assessment of energy resource allocation from a short term consideration of dispatch and
storage to long-term investment decisions. They include a wide range of technologies and
incorporate the energy value chain starting from the different resources and reaching to
various service demands. Eager et al. (2012) use a dynamic investment model that en-
compasses conventional generation investment. They use a Monte Carlo simulation to
include stochastic fuel prices, demand growth, and conventional plant construction. In-
vestors are modeled as risk-averse. The authors assess the level of security of supply
under increasing—exogenously given—investment in RES. They find for a GB case study,
that security of supply is at risk during the years 2020-30. Additionally, they observe
that many new investments can recover their fixed costs only during years in which more
frequent supply shortages push electricity prices higher as particularly peaking units are
even unable to recover their fixed costs. The authors explicitly propose to assess capacity
mechanisms such as strategic reserves and capacity markets in a similar model. Cepeda
and Finon (2013) focus on electricity generation investments and examine two different
market schemes: an energy-only market and a capacity mechanism. Their results show
that capacity mechanisms can help to reduce the social cost of large scale wind power
development—quantified through a decrease in probability for lost load. Furthermore,
they state that in a market-based wind power deployment without any subsidies, wind
generators are penalized for insufficient contribution to the system’s long-term reliability.
This is because there is an implicit reliability constraint in the market that favors reliable
conventional generation over unreliable wind power.
Dynamic investment models (as the ones presented above) often include market feed-
back and technology competition as well as price elasticity, ramping constraints, and strate-
gic behavior of generators that allow these models to properly reflect real-world market
dynamics. These features are crucial to our analyses, since they become more important
with an increasing share of feed-in from RES due to two effects. First, it aggravates de-
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mand fluctuations which make the reflection of ramping constraints more important—they
become binding in more cases. Second, it increases the number of positive and negative
price spikes. The limitation of dynamic investment models however, is the non-optimality
of the solution—there is no indication how close the simulated result is to an optimal
solution.
We propose a dynamic electricity market investment model that uses simulative runs
with an extensive set of important features. We run the model iteratively for multiple
times, until electricity price developments converge, to determine a long-term market out-
come that is sufficiently close to an equilibrium. We provide a three-pronged argument
that the iterative model leads to the desired results: First, for the periods within one iter-
ation, we receive the desired results because we rely on standard procedures such as merit
order bidding, profitability, NPV, etc. to determine reasonable results. Second, over the
course of multiple iterations investors can adjust their behavior to decisions made by other
market participants. Third, in case of convergence, we reach a situation where it is not
desirable for any of the market participants to change their behavior. This type of model
thus reflects realistic market conditions and implements investor behavior that is close to
real-world decision making processes, by including a first phase focused on determining a
sensible starting point for the iteration and a second phase focused on iterating possible
market responses. As a consequence, this model allows us to address the following research
question:
How does a capacity market affect the three major objectives of electricity policy (af-
fordability, reliability, and sustainability)? To this end, three scenarios are considered:
No capacity market (No CM ); Capacity market for new capacity only (CM new); Capac-
ity market for new and existing capacity (CM new&ex ). We compare the results of the
scenarios in terms of the three dimensions of electricity policy as done in several similar
studies such as Kavrakoglu and Kiziltan (1983) as one of the first.
To summarize, we extend the existing literature in three ways. First, we develop a
dynamic capacity investment model that is capable of reflecting ramping costs and con-
straints, strategic bidding, and price elasticity. Second, we quantify the effects of different
capacity market design options and derive policy recommendations. Third, we calibrate
the model to the GB market where a capacity market is currently being implemented.
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3. Dynamic capacity investment model
In this section, we describe the dynamic capacity investment model. A description of
the model’s main building blocks is followed by the details of the model in the second
subsection. For a complete list of symbols used in this section and the following, please
see Tables 4 and 5 in the appendix.
3.1. Main building blocks
Electricity 
market Capacity market
Elec-
tricity ₤
Capacity
₤
Capacity 
require-
ments
₤Elec-tricity ₤
Elec-
tricity
₤
Invest-
ment
Retire-
ment
Invest-
ment
Retire-
ment
Endogenous
Exogenous
Conventional 
generatorRES generator Regulator
Retailer / 
consumer
Figure 1: Illustration of market setup with highlighted endogenous components
The primary goal of our model is to assess the impact of capacity market design op-
tions on an electricity market. At the same time, the model should reflect the effect of
rising intermittent RES generation. Therefore, the model must include the following eight
features. 1. Endogeneity of capacity and electricity market. This includes endogenous
conventional generators and their investment and retirement decisions, as shown in Figure
1. All other characteristics are assumed to be given exogenously—for example demand
patterns, build-up of RES, resource prices and technology characteristics. 2. Inclusion of
all major types of generation10, to reflect competition between these technologies11 and
report long-term generation mixes. 3. Long time horizon T in line with the economic
life of generation assets12 4. Individual profit-maximizing investors who require expected
profitability of all existing generation and new projects. 5. Hourly granularity to track
10For the case of GB this is wind, solar, nuclear, coal, and gas. For other markets it can be adjusted
accordingly.
11We assume a correlation between higher marginal costs in the merit order and higher flexibility. See
also Section 4.1.3 where we show that the assumption holds for the empirical data of the GB case study.
12Economic asset lifetimes typically range between 20 years for renewable and gas-fired generation and
up to 40 (and more) years (DECC, 2010a) for nuclear generation.
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detailed price behavior which is crucial in presence of intermittent RES that lead to more
pronounced and more frequent price fluctuations. Therefore, the model covers a long time
horizon and at the same time calculates market clearing for each hour of each year. 6.
Hourly ramping constraints which become increasingly binding with rising renewable feed-
in. 7. Allowing generators to bid strategically, i.e., above marginal costs, in times of tight
capacity (Newbery, 2002), because tightness may be expected to occur more often with
increasing supply fluctuation in the presence of ramping constraints. 8. Reflection of price
elasticity of demand to include not only investment but also consumer behavior and pos-
sibly increasing capacities of demand response and electricity storage—depending on the
assumptions made in the specific case.
In order to accommodate the aforementioned eight features we build a model that works
in two phases—the initial forecast phase to create a starting value and the actual iteration
phase in which market outcomes are iterated for multiple times until convergence is reached.
Therefore, the model begins with the forecast and subsequently determines the expected
reactions of market participants to that possible price development and derives the first
iteration result—a new generation portfolio development. However, market participants’
investment and divestment decisions may differ from the previous iteration in sight of
this new electricity price development. Hence, we repeat the process of reiterating the
calculation of portfolios and prices based on results of previous runs to derive a converged
generation portfolio. In case of convergence, this represents a likely market outcome as
market participants have no incentive to change their actions in response to expected
outcomes anymore. This general modeling logic can also be used to develop approaches to
assess other electricity market policies and dynamics as in (Ritzenhofen et al., 2014) who
compare different RES support schemes.
3.2. Iteration cycle
Figure 2 illustrates the steps included in the model. The goal of the initial forecast is to
provide a starting point as an initial “best guess” forecast for the core of the model. In the
first actual iteration, we start by calculating electricity prices using that initial portfolio.
These electricity prices can then be used as an expectation for the first profitability as-
sessments. Afterwards, we conduct—in case there is a capacity market scheme in place—a
11
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Figure 2: Model steps
capacity auction in which generators bid their profitability gap13, while expecting elec-
tricity prices as provided by the initial forecast. With the resulting capacity prices and
the expected electricity prices, investors have all the necessary data to make investment
decisions with respect to their generation portfolio. Investors take three decisions: age
retirement—if plants have reached the economic lifetime, divestment—if an existing plant
is not profitable anymore, it is retired before it has reached the economic lifetime, and new
investment—if an investment in a new plant is promising. We limit the model to these
decisions and do not include mothballing and refurbishment of existing plants for two rea-
sons. One, these only represent intermediate steps of retirement and new investments14.
Two, this enhances the clarity and traceability of the investors’ decisions. Based on the
aforementioned three decisions, we derive a new generation portfolio which is the last step
of the first actual iteration and an input to the next iteration. The second iteration then
follows the same procedural steps.
We run these iterations multiple times for all years until changes in the average elec-
tricity price (over all years and hours) are sufficiently small and longitudinal electricity
price developments are sufficiently similar (measured by the Pearson correlation). The
convergence criterion of the change in average electricity prices is shown in 1 with µ being
13The profitability gap is the delta between the earnings from the energy-only market and the investors’
profitability expectation. These expectations are defined by an NPV threshold in case of a new investment
and by a profitability threshold in case of an existing plant.
14Since for example, a series of refurbishments of an existing plant is in terms of costs almost equivalent
to the construction of a new plant.
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a predetermined convergence limit.
∣Pel,∅,it − Pel,∅,it−1
Pel,∅,it−1 ∣ < µ. (1)
It turns out that 10 to 20 runs are in most cases sufficient to meet these criteria. We choose
the electricity price development as the convergence criterion because, most importantly,
it directly influences investors’ key investment and divestment determinant in every year
because it feeds into the cash flow calculations. Additionally, it implicitly reflects changes
in the overall generation portfolio.
3.2.1. Initial forecasting
As the starting point for investors’ expectations of electricity price developments, the
initial generation portfolio is calculated in three steps. These are the same for all three
scenarios. We use the following four index sets: 1) g for the generation technology, g ∈{1, ...,G}, 2) h to specify the hour within a period, h ∈ {1, ...,8760}, 3) t for the year,
t ∈ {1, ..., T}, and 4) it for the iteration, it ∈ {1, ..., itconverged}.
Conventional demand. On the demand side, the conventional (also called residual) load
(DCONVt,h ) is calculated for each hour by subtracting all intermittent RES feed-in (K
disp,REN
t,h )
from the total load (Dt,h). We assume that DCONVt,h cannot be negative and argue that
excess RES generation would either be curtailed or exported,
DCONVt,h =max(Dt,h −Kdisp,RENt,h ; 0) ∀ t, h. (2)
Subsequently, the conventional (residual) load curve is ordered by quantity in descending
sequence and thus we obtain the residual load duration curve (RLDC).
Screening curve. On the supply side, the screening curve (SC) is determined to find the
least cost technology for each load level. For this, we calculate the total cost per technology
CTot,gt depending on its utilization κ by considering total capital C
C,g
t , total fixed C
F,g
t , and
marginal costs CM,gt ,
CTot,gt (κg) = CC,gt +CF,gt +CM,gt ∗ κg ∗ 8760. (3)
Using CTot,gt (κg), we can determine SC as the least cost combination of the total cost
curves of all technologies. Hence, it is a stepwise linear function of the following form:
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SCt(κ) = min[CTot,gt (κg)] =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
CTot,1t (κ), if ub1 ≥ κ > lb1
CTot,2t (κ), if ub2 ≥ κ > lb2
..., ...
CTot,gt (κ), if ubg ≥ κ > lbg.
(4)
Where lbx and ubx represent the lower bound and the upper bound of the utilization
range where technology x is most cost-efficient generation technology with lbG = 0, ub1 =
1, and lbx = ubx+1 ∀ x = 1...(G − 1).
Initial generation portfolio. We determine the initial generation portfolio by mapping the
SC onto the RLDC. The SC yields the most cost-efficient conventional types of generation
for all capacity utilization rates, while the RLDC provides the capacity requirements for all
capacity utilization rates. Hence, by combining both, we can determine the cost-optimal
capacity mix. This initial portfolio, however, abstracts from existing capacities and hence
only represents a good starting point for the iteration—it does not represent an optimal
market outcome.
3.2.2. Electricity market
Based on the initial generation forecast, the actual iterations are run. The first step is
to derive a forecast of electricity prices from a given generation portfolio.
Electricity market clearing with ramping and price elasticity. The electricity prices result
from the given residual load and the conventional generation portfolio. This is done by
matching the merit order of supply and demand for each hour. Thus, the load is matched
with the merit order based on the marginal costs of all available generation—accounting
for ramping constraints and price elasticity. The most expensive generator, necessary to
fulfill demand, sets the market price for that hour. The model accounts for price elasticity,
i.e., for consumption to be reduced in times of high prices and to be increased in times of
low prices. We implement this by allowing for sloped, not fully vertical demand curves.
The slope of the demand function is defined as β while the maximum demand at a price
of 0 is described by D0,t,h. The realized demand Dt,h is hence defined as a function of the
price in the respective period Pel,t,h
Dt,h(Pel,t,h) =D0,t,h − β ∗ Pel,t,h. (5)
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If existing generation is not sufficient, the model determines a loss of load occasion and
sets the price to the exogenously given value of lost load (VOLL). We run this matching
mechanism for each hour in all years and obtain an electricity price development over the
whole time frame (T). Since we run the mechanism for each hour in chronological order,
ramping constraints can also be accounted for. To do that, the model compares for each
hour h and each technology g the required capacity for that hour with the utilized capacity
in the previous hour h − 1. In case the delta (i.e., the ramp) between these two values is
too high (i.e., too steep) the ramping constraint comes into effect and the ramp cannot be
realized. In case of a ramp-up, the next more expensive technology in terms of marginal
costs has to jump in. This leads to a change in the merit order because one technology
can effectively only provide a smaller amount of capacity than expected and hence gives
way to the next technology. Hence, the available capacity of a certain generator Kavail,gt,h
is the minimum of its actual capacity and the capacity taking its ramping constraint into
account.
Kavail,gt,h =min(Kgt,h;Kdisp,gt,h−1 ∗ %gu) (6)
In case of a ramp-down, on the other hand, a binding ramp-down constraint leads to
some plants continuing to run even though they are not needed to match demand. In that
situation, cycling cost CCy,g come into effect to reflect the additional cost that are incurred
by slowly ramping the plants down to avoid damage to the machinery, e.g., turbines and
boilers. These costs are added to the marginal costs,
CM,gt,h =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Cfuel,gt +CCO2,gt +CM−other,gt +CCy,g, if %gd is binding
Cfuel,gt +CCO2,gt +CM−other,gt , if %gd is not binding. (7)
Where Cfuelt and C
CO2
t are the fuel and CO2 cost and η
fuel,g and ηCO2,g the respective
technology specific fuel and CO2 intensities, while C
M−other,g
t are other marginal costs
(such as variable maintenance costs).
Strategic bidding. In addition to the previously described merit order logic, we need to
account for strategic bidding of market participants. This type of bidding behavior has
two different facets. On the one hand, it can help the marginal bidder to cover investment
and fixed cost. Hence, this reduces the number of hours during which the price needs
to increase to VOLL because it provides a way to recover fixed costs and investment
for marginal generators and therefore less need for prices at the VOLL. On the other
hand, it represents a form of exercise of market power and leads to additional profits
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of generators. As indicated by several studies for the GB market (Po¨yry, 2009) and for
other markets (Sioshansi and Oren, 2007; Bushnell et al., 2008; Borenstein et al., 1999),
liberalized electricity markets provide opportunities for the exercise of market power and
generators indeed try to bid strategically and exercise market power. One of the best
known examples is the one of the Californian energy crisis in 2000 (Joskow and Kahn,
2001). As seen in California, the effect occurs mostly at times of capacity shortage and
can rise to an enormous magnitude. Therefore, we follow Eager et al. (2012) in accounting
for strategic behavior by introducing a price markup function ω(Kmargt,h ). Based on this
function, the extent of market power is described as a function of the available capacity
margin Kmargt,h —the margin between demand and available capacity at a certain point in
time. Kmargt,h is defined as
Kmargt,h = ∑Gg=1Kavail,gt,h −Dt,h∑Gg=1Kavail,gt,h . (8)
The markup function ω(Kmargt,h ) would typically be expected to be defined as 0 as long as
the capacity margin is sufficiently large, e.g., greater than 20% and to steeply rise to a
high markup for a capacity margin of 0-20%. In this way, we preserve the convexity of the
price function even in the presence of strategic behavior thus preserving concavity of the
profit function. With a given capacity margin, ω(Kmargt,h ) yields the markup factor that
increases the electricity price PEl,e,gt,h as follows
PEl,e,g,ωt,h (Kmargt,h ) = PEl,e,gt,h ∗ (1 + ω(Kmargt,h )). (9)
3.2.3. Investment decisions
Age retirement. The model checks the age of all power plants against their economic life-
time (LF g) and retires all plants for which the age exceeds the lifetime,
Kgt =Kgt−1 −Kg,age−rett . (10)
Retirement of unprofitable existing generation. The model calculates the profitability (Πg,et )
for all existing plants e in year t. In terms of revenue, the average15 price of electricity
(P g,eel,avg,it) multiplied by the expected dispatched capacity (K
disp,g,e
el,t,h ) is summed up over all
hours. In terms of cost, the fixed (CF,gt ) and marginal costs (C
M,g
t ) of the type of technology
are subtracted,
Πg,et = 8760∑
h=1 ((P g,eel,t,h,it −CM,gt ) ∗Kdisp,g,eel,t,h ) −CF,gt . (11)
15Average over the future years of operation.
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Investors combine two pieces of information to forecast the expected electricity price
P g,eel,t,h,it. First, the price that has been observed in the previous year in the current iteration
and second, the price for the current year in the previous iterations. This is reasonable,
because an investor would equally consider current price levels and also factor in the expec-
tations of future price developments. In line with exponential smoothing, these two pieces
are weighed with the factor α and (1 − α) to obtain P g,eel,t,h,it. In addition, the application
of exponential smoothing supports convergence as multiple previous market outcomes are
included in investors’ decision making processes and hence they are less likely to overreact
on a specific recent market situation. Subsequently, all existing generation that exceeds
a given unprofitability threshold (Γg) is retired to reflect that investors withdraw from
their investments (as described in Bloomberg (2013b); Platts (2013)), if a given level of
unprofitability is reached.
Investment in new generation. In terms of new generation, the NPV of new investments
(ngt ) of technology g in year t is determined over the entire economic lifetime (LF
g).
Therein, initial investments CI,g, expected profits (see above) of all years, and the discount
rate r are considered
NPV n
g ,g
t = −CI,g + t+LF g∑
i=t (Πng ,gi ∗ (1 + r)−(i−t)). (12)
Based on these results, investors invest in NPV-positive projects and reject NPV-negative
ones. They invest in the order of the NPV—starting with the most positive ones. The
model limits the maximum buildup to bn
g ,g
max of plants per year per technology. This is
to reflect constraints in manufacturing as well as project development and construction
capacities of the market. Hence, the investor undertakes the considered investment if
NPV n
g ,g
t > 0 and ng ≤ bng ,gmax. (13)
Therefore, the decisions are made in a way prescribed by a greedy algorithm—the most
profitable investments are pursued first until one of the constraints is binding.
3.2.4. Capacity market
Capacity market for new capacity only (CM new). In this scenario, we introduce a capacity
market for new capacity only as part of the investor decision making. The CM new is an
auction that matches previously determined capacity demand and supply (given by the
participants’ bids).
On the demand side, we determine the required new capacity by taking the given peak
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demand plus the reserve margin φ and subtracting the existing plants that will be divested
due to unprofitability and age. The reserve margin φ, set by the regulator, is the required
capacity that is needed on top of expected peak demand to ensure generation adequacy. It
is un-derated, i.e., the rate does not include expected maintenance of generation capacities.
We obtain the unprofitable existing plants with the same logic as in 3.2.3.
On the supply side, the model collects all bids and runs the capacity auction that, in
this scenario, allows all reliable new generation to bid. We assume that all investors bid
the annuity16 of the profitability gap. The capacity market thus ensures a payment at the
level of the auction clearing price over multiple years17. Therefore, we calculate the NPVs
of all new generation (see 3.2.3) and, in case the NPV is negative, each project bids the
annual payment BCMnew,n,gt necessary to increase the negative NPV to 0. In case the NPV
is already positive without a capacity market, the investor bids 0,
BCMnew,n,gt =max(0;−−CI,g +∑t+LF gi=t (Πg,ni ∗ (1 + r)−(i−t))∑tpayi=1 ((1 + r)−i) ) . (14)
Subsequently, all bids are put in ascending order and form the supply curve that is matched
with the demand. Hence, the market is cleared and all generation that is required to fulfill
demand receives the clearing price as a certain payment over a number of years tpay (e.g.
10).
For the capacity market we assume no strategic bidding. As argued by Cramton and
Stoft (2005), this can be realized through a sensible design of the demand curve with two
important elements. First, there should be a price cap that can, for example, be set to the
annualized investment and fixed cost of an OCGT power plant18. Second, a price-sensitive
reserve margin (φ) should be used with a minimum and maximum range. Determined
through these two regulatory assumptions, the demand curve can be established. With
that type of demand curve, “much of strategic bidding can be eliminated” (Cramton and
Stoft, 2005) and thus we abstract from it. We assume the use of a demand curve that is
similar to the one also proposed in DECC (2013a) (also shown in Figure 3).
Capacity market for new and existing capacity (CM new&ex). The CM new&ex scenario
works similarly to the CM new scenario. We also adjust the investor decision-making by
16For example a 10 year annuity in case the payment is guaranteed for 10 years.
17See for example DECC (2013a) where the price is planned to be contracted for 10 or more years.
18Which could be built by the regulator if the provided bids are too high.
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Figure 3: Illustrative capacity demand and supply curves (DECC, 2013a)
introducing a capacity market for new and existing generation. The CM new&ex is very
similar to the CM new with only one simplification. Where, in the CM new scenario, the
regulator had to anticipate plant retirements, we now only take the expected demand at
peak, plus the given reserve margin φ to determine the required capacity to be provided
from all existing and new generation,
DCMnew&ext =DEL,peakt ∗ (1 + φ). (15)
The capacity market itself uses the same logic but allows bids from existing generation as
well. These generators bid their profitability gap and neglect investments since these are
sunk. This means, that if a generator who misses money to cover its fixed cost and who
does not receive any capacity payments will retire the plant—according to the divestment
logic explained previously. Hence, we have the following two forms of bids:
BCMnew&ex,e,gt =max(0;−(8760∑
h=1 ((P g,eel,t,h −CM,gt ) ∗Kdisp,g,eel,t,h ) −CF,gt )) (16)
BCMnew&ex,n,gt =max(0;−−CI,g +∑t+LF gi=t (Πg,ni ∗ (1 + r)−(i−t))∑LF gi=1 ((1 + r)−i) ) . (17)
All bids of existing as well as new generation are brought in ascending order and the supply
curve is matched with the demand. Subsequently, all generation left of demand receives
the capacity clearing price. In case it is new generation for 10 years, otherwise for only
one year.
3.2.5. Iteration, feedback, and convergence
Calculation of prices and technology mixes for all years. We conduct the previous steps (2-
4)—i.e., electricity price clearing, investor decisions, and generation portfolio determination—
for all years until t=T. By reaching this point, the model has considered all periods of one
iteration and can obtain a new electricity price development and a new average electricity
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price.
Feedback and convergence. After an iteration, we check the average electricity price against
the one of the previous iteration. If the values differ (see Equation 1) by more than a certain
percentage value (µ), we proceed to the next iteration and steps 2-4 are repeated another
T times (i.e., for all years) until a new electricity price development has been determined.
In that case, the electricity price development of the current iteration is used as the price
forecast for the following iteration. Hence, we use this as the feedback mechanism of the
model. If the difference is smaller than µ and the longitudinal electricity price developments
are highly correlated, we consider the results as converged and interpret the result as a
likely market outcome as investors have no incentive to change their investment behavior
anymore.
4. GB case study
We choose the GB market for our case study, because the introduction of a capacity
market is currently in the process of legislation and implementation in this market. The
latest plans include a first capacity auction in 2014 (for capacity available in 2018). In order
to reflect the situation in this market as closely as possible, we make several assumptions
which we discuss in the first subsection. Subsequently, we present our results in the second
subsection. We report all numbers (assumptions as well as results) in 2013 real terms, i.e.,
we abstract from inflation. In case references report earlier numbers, we inflate them by
an average rate of 3% (Trading Economics, 2014) per year to reach 2013 terms.
4.1. Assumptions
4.1.1. General market and model parameters
We report results for a 20 year time frame (2014-2034) but run the model in the
background for 60 years to omit distortions from an end of horizon effect—cf. Dantzig
et al. (1978). We assume a development of fuel prices for coal, gas, and oil according to the
expectations of UKERC (2013) and of carbon prices according to the Department of Energy
and Climate Change (DECC) central case (DECC, 2013b). We report these developments
in Figure 4 (center and left). We set the value of lost load (VOLL) according to London
Economics (2013) to £10,000/MWh. The model stops the iteration if prices change by less
than 1% from one iteration to the next one—i.e., µ = 0,01. Sensitivities of µ show that
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a decrease to µ = 0,001 reduces the speed of convergence by 20-40% (depending on the
exact input value). Hence, it only leads to a limited number of additional iterations. The
weighting factor of current prices (α) and expected future prices (1 − α) is set to α = 0.75
and (1 − α) = 0.25 respectively. The parameter alpha can only be estimated, there are no
sources available for the validation of this assumption. Therefore, we conduct sensitivity
analyses on alpha and do not observe structural changes in results as long as alpha does
not reach either of the extreme ends of the [0;1] interval. However, values close to 0 or 1
are not sensible from an economic point of view because they imply that investors only
focus on either future or current prices respectively.
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Figure 4: Carbon price and renewable quota (left), fuel prices (center), strategic bidding price markup
(right)
For the capacity market scenarios, the regulator sets an un-derated capacity margin
φ of 10%—however, we also run a sensitivity analysis for 15%. This capacity margin is
used in the capacity market to determine the amount of capacity that is to be secured
in the capacity auction. For intermittent RES, we assume a worst case availability of 0,
as done in the GB market. Hence, these are not allowed to participate in the capacity
market. However, the model can easily be adjusted to equally allow RES to bid, e.g., their
expected load factor at peak—as done in markets such as PJM in the U.S.. The price
markup function ω(Kmargt,h ) is implemented as depicted in Figure 4 (right). Markups start
at an available capacity margin of 10%, reach 50% at 10% available capacity margin, and
200% at 0% available capacity margin—below that, the price is set to the VOLL.
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CI,g CF,g CM,g1 η
g
fuel η
g
CO2
CM−other,g
Invest Fixed Marginal Fuel int. CO2 int. Other marg.
£/MW £/MW*yr £/MWh GJ/MWh t/MWh £/MWh
Nuclear 4,295,250 72,000 10.6 0.00 0.00 10.6
Coal 1,647,700 51,750 33.2 9.20 0.73 1.0
CCGT 668,900 23,182 37.6 7.20 0.33 0.1
OCGT 598,500 23,000 47.2 8.78 0.495 0.0
Oil 1,647,700 23,000 96.9 13.29 0.73 0.0
Table 1: Technology cost parameters
Kg0 Q
g U g0 Age
Init. cap. Capacity Plants 0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-29 30-40
MW MW/plant # # # # # # #
Nuclear 9,946 1,105 9 0 0 0 1 4 4
Coal 23,072 1,538 15 0 0 1 0 14 -
CCGT 33,113 808 41 7 2 14 13 5 -
OCGT 2,151 307 7 0 1 2 3 1 -
Oil 2,338 102 23 0 0 11 12 - -
Table 2: Technology parameters—initial portfolio
4.1.2. Investment decision parameters
Investors are assumed to apply a discount rate r of 8% to their investments. The
maximum buildup (in plants per year) for the GB market is set to 1 plant for the nuclear
technology, 2 for coal, and 5 for CCGT, 20 for OCGT, and 5 for oil. This is derived
from capital intensity (see Table 1 for details) and complexity of the respective technology.
Similar to the maximum buildup there is also a maximum divestment per year. The model
limits the amount of divestment per year to three units of the smaller OCGT and oil
plants and to one unit of the larger CCGT, coal, and nuclear plants. This is due to the
fact that investors have an incentive not to divest all plants in the same year and rather
keep the optionality and wait for the market to develop. Before a divestment is actually
executed, a divestment threshold (Γg) must be reached - this has been suggested in several
discussions with private investors. Therefore, we set Γg to 50% of CF,g, i.e., the fixed cost
of the respective technology arguing that an investor would only consider divestment if the
yearly loss is larger than 50% of the plant’s fixed annual costs.
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LF g ξ %gu %
g
d C
Cy,g
Econ. life Availability Ramp up Ramp down Cycling costs
Years Percent %/(plant*h) %/(plant*h) £/MW
Nuclear 40 90 55 55 67,34
Coal 30 90 70 70 50,62
CCGT 20 95 100 100 33,67
OCGT 20 98 100 100 15,57
Oil 20 98 100 100 15,57
Table 3: Technology parameters on lifetime, availability, and ramping
4.1.3. Technology parameters
We use three groups of technology data—cost parameters, initial portfolio characteris-
tics, and parameters regarding lifetime, availability, and ramping. First, the cost param-
eters, shown in Table 1, are based on an industry report by Parsons Brinckerhoff (2011)
and validated with experts from the SIEMENS power division.
Second, the information regarding the current GB generation portfolio is derived from
DECC (2013a) and shown in Table 2. In some cases we found plants that already exceed
the expected economic lifetime—in these cases we normalized the data19.
Third, all parameters with regards to lifetime (LF g), availability, and ramping are pre-
sented in Table 3. The ramping parameters %gu and %
g
d represent the share of capacity that
can be ramped up or down within one hour in a warm start scenario, %gu and %
g
d are derived
from Vuorinen (2009), Chiodia et al. (2010), and VDE (2012) while the ramping costs can
be found in Kumar et al. (2012). Combining the information on ramping constraints and
on marginal costs, we see that the assumption of a correlation between higher marginal
costs in the merit order and a higher flexibility holds true for the empirical data of our GB
case study.
4.1.4. RES technology and demand data
We assume RES to be exogenous to the model because our model is focused on assessing
the effect of the introduction of capacity markets. We consider the discussion around
renewable energy support schemes as a different field of research. Hence, we treat the
19Using the following procedure: we reduced the plant age by 10 years and checked whether the age
falls into the expected economic lifetime. If yes, we kept that age, if not, we repeated the process. This
procedure reflects a major plant overhaul which needs to be done at the end of the economic lifetime to
allow the plant to run for a certain number of additional years.
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build-up of renewables as exogenous to the model as it is determined by a different set of
regulatory instruments. We employ three components to determine renewable electricity
production over 60 years in an hourly granularity. First, we use RES production profiles
for sample years in hourly granularity to include realistic fluctuation and distributions. For
onshore and offshore wind, we include GB capacity factor data of the sample year 2005 from
Green and Vasilakos (2010). For solar PV capacity factors, we make use of German data
from Gemsjaeger (2012) due to the lack of publicly available GB data. This inaccuracy is
bearable, because solar PV only represent a very small share of GB’s (renewable) electricity
generation and the German capacity factors are very similar to the ones in GB. Second,
In the case of all intermittent RES generation, we multiply these capacity factors by the
installed capacity. The current (2013) generation capacity is reported in DECC’s DUKES
report (DECC, 2013a) at 5,900 MW for wind onshore, 3,000 MW for wind offshore, and
1,700 MW for solar PV. Third, we scale these generation capacities up, according to the
government’s policy targets for renewable energy production. These include a buildup
from 11% of electricity generation in 2013 to 30% in 2020 and 35% in 2030 as depicted
in Figure 4 (left) (DECC, 2010b, 2011). Sensitivity analyses on lower/higher build-up of
renewables show that all design options are similarly affected through a lower/higher share
of renewable generation but there are no structural changes in the comparison between the
design options.
On the demand side we also use a 2005 demand profile with an hourly granularity from
Green and Vasilakos (2010)—consistent with the wind profiles. The model allows this to
be equally scaled as done with RES feed-in. However, we leave demand stable over time
due to the expectation that demand growth and efficiency gains level out. Additionally,
we incorporate the short-term price elasticity of demand that could be realized through
demand response programs. We set βt it to the low value of 0.1 £/(MWh)2, however,
because we do not yet expect high shares of demand to be included in demand response
programs.
4.2. Results
In the following, we describe the results obtained from running the model with the
above-presented parameters and assumptions. The model is implemented in MATLAB
version R2012a.
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4.2.1. Overview
We compare the three previously described scenarios (No CM, CM new, CM new&ex )
along the three dimensions of electricity policy—affordability, reliability, and sustainabil-
ity. To represent affordability, we report three metrics: first, yearly total bill of electricity
generation20 (this includes all revenues realized by (conventional21) generators—from the
energy-only market as well as the capacity market), second, average electricity price de-
velopment, and third, average capacity price development. With regards to reliability, we
present electricity price volatility and the number of lost load occasions. Finally, sustain-
ability is represented by the system’s yearly CO2 emissions.
Our case study shows that the introduction of a capacity market has a positive effect
on the market in terms of affordability and reliability because the total bill of generation
decreases and lost load does not occur as opposed to the No CM case. Sustainability
is not affected by a CM new&ex, while it is positively affected by a CM new because
this scheme leads to new investments in less CO2-intensive gas-fired generation instead of
existing coal-fired generation. Furthermore, we identify differences between the two design
options of capacity markets—a CM new leads to a lower total bill of generation than a
CM new&ex.
To provide more detail behind these overarching statements, we discuss the metrics
depicted in Figure 5 one by one. The total bill of generation is higher without a capacity
market than with a capacity market. There are two reasons to explain that difference.
First, lost load which is priced at a high cost22 (£10,000/MWh) occurs more frequently
due to investors providing less capacity to increase profit per plant. Second, capacity
margins that lead to more potential for strategic behavior and bidding above marginal
costs get tighter. By contrast, with the introduction of a capacity market, there is always
sufficient capacity in the market and hence less potential to exercise market power. The
average capacity price of £32,000-41,000 per MW per year leads to cost of roughly £2-4
billion per year but does not outweigh the benefits of mitigating lost load occasions and
20One could also consider total welfare as a metric to compare the scenarios in terms of affordability.
However, in our perception, regulators, consumers, and policy makers are mostly focused on the bill of
generation when discussing capacity markets. Therefore, we focus on this measure and leave an analysis
on total welfare to future research. A discussion of economic welfare would also require a more thorough
discussion of the demand function and its shape.
21We exclude RES because these are exogenous to the model and equal in all three scenarios.
22Compared to the marginal cost of expensive peak load generation in the magnitude of £100/MWh
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Figure 5: Overview of results
strategic bidding potential. The average electricity prices reflect the difference caused by
the presence or absence of a capacity market—without a capacity market, all investment
incentives are provided through the electricity price. As limited capacity installations
occur, capacity shortages happen more often and lead to higher prices that consequently
incentivize investment. Moreover, all results across all three scenarios in terms of costs
must be seen in the light of the assumed steeply increasing CO2 prices. These lead to
prices significantly higher than observed in today’s market. To give an estimate of the
extent of that effect: if we assumed CO2 prices to stay at £5 per ton throughout the time
horizon, the above-presented bill of generation values would decrease by roughly 25-30%.
All scenarios are similarly affected by this assumption. However, this only affects the
absolute values, but it does not change the structure and the relative differences of the
results between scenarios.
The reliability metrics volatility and lost load also show an advantage for the capacity
market scenarios. The electricity price volatility is significantly lower with a capacity
market (14% as opposed to 91%) and there are no situations of lost load—both due to a
larger amount of capacity in the market.
The introduction of a capacity market for new and existing generation does not change
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CO2 emissions. Under a CM new however, we observe a decrease in CO2 emissions of
about 5%. This can be explained by the fact that a capacity market for new generation
only incentivizes investment in new fuel-efficient gas-fired generation and leads to an earlier
retirement of existing inefficient coal-fired generation.
4.2.2. Electricity prices
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Figure 6: Electricity price development
Looking more closely at the electricity price developments over 20 years visualized in
Figure 6, we can make three major observations. First, in all scenarios average prices
rise over time. This is due to the rising CO2 cost as shown in Figure 4 (left). The U.K.
government plans to significantly increase cost of CO2 emissions that will be passed on to
consumers through increasing electricity prices.
Second, several years of high prices occur in the No CM scenario. These are due
to capacity retirements given existing generation not being replaced by new investments
because of missing investment incentives. The reduced capacities lead to higher prices and
hence, help create sufficient incentives for new investment in the following years. This is
the case around year 2020 with several occurrences of lost load. These findings are in line
with the simulations of Eager et al. (2012), who also anticipate capacity shortages around
the year 2020 in their GB case study.
Third, the electricity price development is stabilized through a capacity market. With
a capacity market, an investment can expect revenues from both, the energy-only and the
capacity market. As investors bid the profitability gap, the capacity bid is the one that
fluctuates as we discuss in the following section. Additionally, the situation of unstable
investment incentives under the No CM scenario in the years around 2020 also leads to
more fluctuations in electricity prices and therefore to more price volatility.
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4.2.3. Capacity prices
The capacity prices show strong fluctuations in the rage between 0 and 150,000 £/MW
for both design options with an average of 30,000-40,000 £/MW (see Figure 5). This
can be explained by the fact that different capacity requirements in each year lead to
different types of capacity bids. Market conditions differ from year to year because they
depend on demand development and capacity retirement (due to end of economic lifetime
or unprofitability). In case of a demand increase and many retirements, a large capacity
gap can be expected, whereas decreasing demand and stable existing capacity can even
lead to overcapacity. These market conditions determine whether existing capacity is
sufficient or new capacity must be built. The bids of generators in the capacity auction
depend on two factors. First, whether the marginal bidder is existing or new capacity and
second, on the type of technology. Bids are very low, often even zero, if the plant exists
already because the necessary costs of keeping the plant running are very low. On the
other hand, new generation requires high capacity prices to cover for the investment. The
combination of the changing market conditions and different types of bids leads to the
jumps in prices. However, we should keep in mind that the contracts are designed in a way
that new generation is guaranteed the price of the auction in which it has been cleared for
10 years. Hence, it is independent from fluctuations of capacity prices.
4.2.4. Generation portfolio
The discussion of the generation portfolio can be simplified through two explanatory
notes. First, RES generation capacity (i.e., the top three rows in Figure 7) is determined
exogenously and therefore identical in all three scenarios. Second, nuclear generation, given
the cost assumptions, is an attractive investment target. Therefore, it is being built at the
maximum rate which keeps nuclear capacity roughly stable over time due to retirements of
the rather old current GB nuclear assets. This effect is identical across all three scenarios.
Hence, differences are only seen in coal, gas, and oil fired technologies.
For the No CM case we observe a capacity reduction in the first 5 years that leads
to the price spikes discussed earlier. From 2018 on, capacity is being gradually increased
mainly in gas-fired technologies with an emphasis on OCGT. In contrast, capacity levels
with a capacity market are significantly higher. The results show that the mechanism
leads to more available gas-fired capacity—mainly OCGT and some additional CCGT. We
see that the technology profiting the most from a capacity market is OCGT with its low
28
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
0
20
40
60
80
100
2014 16 18 2020 22 24 26 28 2030 32
GW
             
             
              Solar PV
             
             
              Wind offshore
             
             
              Wind onshore
Oil
OCGT
CCGT
Hard coal
             
             
              Nuclear
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
0
20
40
60
80
100
2014 16 18 2020 22 24 26 28 2030 32
GW
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
0
20
40
60
80
100
2014 16 18 2020 22 24 26 28 2030 32
GW
Figure 7: Generation portfolio without a capacity market (top row: No CM ) and with a capacity market
(bottom left: CM new, bottom right: CM new&ex )
investment and high marginal cost. The plants are mostly constructed to provide sufficient
capacity with low load factors.
4.2.5. Model convergence
We reach the convergence criterion in iteration 16 for the No CM scenario while both
capacity market scenarios converge more quickly—see Figure 8. The rationale is, that
the higher level of capacity induced by the capacity market leads to more price stability
and therefore to less differences in the reactions of other market participants to outcomes
of previous iterations. To show not only convergence of the average electricity price but
also of longitudinal electricity price developments, we include Figure 9. We observe that
the price development is rather flat in the initial forecast (It0) while it converges towards
a development that exhibits peaks as discussed earlier over the iterations (see It4–It16).
Additionally, we see that the Pearson correlation (shown in ”()” behind the iteration)
indeed increases over the iterations. Together, these two criteria allow us to conclude that
the market has reached a stable equilibrium.
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Figure 8: Change in average electricity price over the iterations
0
50
100
150
2014 16 18 2020 22 24 26 28 2030 32
₤
/M
W
h
It0 It4 (0.726) It8 (0.904) It12 (0.995) It16 (0.999)
Figure 9: Longitudinal electricity price development (in the NoCM scenario) in different iterations (Pear-
son correlation of electricity price developments)
4.2.6. Sensitivity analyses
In order to check the robustness of the results and to provide more information on
controversially discussed assumptions, we run several sensitivity analyses. We show a
comparison of the total bill of generation in the sensitivity results compared to the general
results in Figure 10.
No strategic bidding. First, we deactivate the opportunity for strategic bidding by setting
ω(Kmargt,h ) = 0 for all levels of residual capacity. We observe that without any potential
for strategic bidding, the No CM scenario is as cost-efficient as the CM new. The reason
for this is that both schemes are equally efficient in providing the exact amount of nec-
essary incentives for sufficient new generation investments. In the No CM scenario these
incentives arise from occasions of lost load that drive up the prices in a limited number
of hours per year. While in the CM new scenario incentives arise from the capacity mar-
ket where the payments are guaranteed for 10 years in case of new capacity construction.
Consequently, the electricity price volatility is very high without a capacity market 130%
30
(as opposed 11% in both CM scenarios) and there are on average 3.25 hours of lost load
(as opposed to 0 with a CM). The CM new&ex scenario is more expensive than the other
two scenarios, because it also remunerates existing generation with capacity payments. In
conclusion, the absence of strategic bidding diminishes the advantage of the CM scenarios
on the affordability dimension, while the benefits in terms of reliability continue to hold.
Stable CO2 emission cost. Second, we change the assumptions on the CO2 price develop-
ment to a stable CO2 price at £5 per ton instead of the steep increase as currently proposed
by the British Government. We find that the total bill of generation falls by roughly 25-
30% across all scenarios. Additionally, we observe that prices of electricity do not rise
over time anymore but instead are stable at the low level of the beginning. The No CM
scenario is more positively affected by a lower CO2 price because it is completely reliant on
marginal cost bidding of generators and the CO2 cost are a part of these marginal costs.
In the capacity market scenarios however, a share of the total bill of generation comes from
the capacity market that is less influenced by the change in generator’s marginal costs. In
terms of CO2 emissions, we see a rise of 1/3 due to a shift in generation and capacities
from gas to coal.
Stable fuel prices. Third, we test the effect of stable fuel prices instead of a slightly declining
coal price and rising gas and oil prices in our general assumptions. The results show a 10-
15% decrease in the total bill of generation across all scenarios as well as an increase in
CO2 emissions by 25%. Again, the No CM scenario is more positively affected by the fuel
price decrease for the same reasons as stated in the discussion of the previous sensitivity
on stable CO2 emission cost.
Reserve margin at 15% instead of 10%. Fourth, we set the reserve margin to a higher level
of 15% instead of 10% and find higher capacity cost in both capacity market scenarios (up
by 10%) due to additional capacity payments for the additional 5% of capacity. The new
capacity is entirely gas-fired (both, CCGT and OCGT).
VOLL at £2,500 instead of £10,000. Finally, we find that a reduced VOLL slightly lowers
the total bill of generation in the NoCM scenario. However, even a reduction of the VOLL
to 25% (2,500) of its standard value (10,000) only reduces the total bill of generation in the
NoCM scenario by 2%. This is due to the fact, that hours with lost load (and high prices)
are needed as an investment incentive. Hence, reducing the VOLL leads to more hours
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with lost load—thus balancing the lower (VOLL) prices with a higher number of VOLL
hours. The CM results are largely unaffected by the changes in VOLL because hours with
lost load do (almost) never occur in these scenarios.
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Figure 10: Comparison of sensitivity results with the general results
5. Discussion
5.1. Policy implications
In our case study we make projections of GB market prices and generation mixes that
are specific to the properties of the market at hand. However, there are four findings
from this study that can be generalized to foster a policy discussion on capacity markets
in general because they depend on the overarching electricity market structure and are
independent from GB-specifics. First, capacity markets increase generation adequacy.
Second, capacity markets do not necessarily increase the total bill of generation. Third,
it is cheaper to set up a capacity market for new generation only but risky from a policy
perspective. Fourth, a capacity market can be desirable if there is a risk of capacity
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shortage. However, if there is significant overcapacity during an extended period of time,
there is no need for a capacity market.
We find that in the two capacity market scenarios generation adequacy indeed improves
significantly by providing incentives for the construction of additional capacity. This is
shown by a lower number of lost load occasions as well as by a reduced electricity price
volatility. This result was expected as achieving generation adequacy is the major goal of
a capacity market.
In capacity market policy discussions around the world, critics of capacity markets ar-
gue that capacity remuneration improves generation adequacy at the expense of an increase
in the total bill of generation (ACER, 2013; TCAPTX, 2013). Most studies arguing in this
way neglect two important factors that we incorporate in our model: First, the interde-
pendency of capacity and electricity markets leading to decreasing electricity wholesale
prices if revenues is also obtained from a capacity market. Second, strategic behavior and
above marginal cost bidding in an energy-only market resulting in wholesale electricity
prices that partially reflect market power in times of shortage rather than marginal costs.
Drawing from our results we can argue that this does not always hold true. Moreover,
assuming the existence of strategic bidding in the energy-only market and assuming the
successful prevention of strategic bidding in the capacity market, the introduction of a
capacity market can even decrease the long-term overall the total bill of generation as
we observe in our GB case study. In that case, capacity markets add £2-4 billion to the
generation bill. However, by providing additional capacity and reducing the potential for
lost load and strategic bidding, that addition is overcompensated by £3-5 billion in bill
of generation savings. While the extent of this effect is likely to differ across markets, it
is important that these secondary effects23 are taken into account as well. Therefore, a
policy discussion should be supported and informed through a quantitative model that is
able to reflect such effects.
Should all generation that provides capacity be eligible for capacity remuneration from
the capacity market, or only the newly built capacity? We find that it is cheaper to
only pay new capacity. With a CM new less capacity payments get disbursed in the first
years since only new investments need to receive these. Despite this observation, a policy
maker should bear two further factors in mind. First, by only paying new generation,
23E.g., the impact of a capacity market on strategic bidding and lost load occasions.
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investors are incentivized to retire existing generation earlier, because it is not profitable
anymore and there is no access to the capacity market. This leads to an earlier need to
incentivize investment in new generation through the capacity market. Hence, there is a
faster capacity turnaround leading to a situation where a larger number of new generators
receive high capacity payments. Second, as argued by Cramton et al. (2013), the strategy of
not paying existing generation24 might work once, if investors are surprised but afterwards
would lead to investors requiring additional protection from future unequal treatments and
a risk premium. Apart from that, in the long-term both design options converge, because
gradually there will be no generation left that existed before the introduction of the CM
and all generation is covered by the capacity mechanism. Therefore, regulators should
carefully consider, whether the cost reduction is worth the effect of increasing investment
uncertainty that results from such an unequal treatment.
Finally, capacity markets are only desirable if the market is relatively close to a capacity
shortage. The reason for this is that the major goal of a capacity market is to ensure
sufficient capacity in the system at all times. If this is already the case without a capacity
market, it should not be introduced. The current situation in Germany shows a market
with significant overcapacity (Bloomberg, 2012; Timera Energy, 2013). In that situation a
capacity market would induce unnecessary additional cost. For a market like this, it might
be, in the short- and medium-term, more desirable to use a strategic reserves scheme that
can be easily adjusted and locally focused. However, in the long-term a strategic reserve
has other disadvantages (see Section 1 for details), so that this scheme could be transformed
into a capacity market as soon as a capacity shortage is looming.
5.2. Limitations
Even though we include a wide range of important features of electricity markets, one
should keep in mind when discussing the results of our model, that we also have leave out
a number of complexities of these markets. At this point, we abstract from stochastici-
ties, the transmission system, and storage. In terms of stochasticity, we do not include
unexpected unavailabilities of conventional generation and long-term uncertainties of re-
newable energies (while we include short-term renewable fluctuation). With regards to
the transmission system, additional features could be the modeling of the grid topology
24This unequal treatment can even be called a regulatory taking or expropriation.
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(including transmission capacities and transmission losses), locational demand and gener-
ation (to determine nodal shortages and exact unit commitment), and interconnections to
neighboring countries. These features represent areas for further research and an extension
of the presented model. However, we are confident that our major findings with regards
to capacity market policy also hold without these features because they would affect all
scenarios similarly and not change the structure of the results.
6. Conclusion and further research
We present a dynamic capacity investment model that is well suited for policy assess-
ments regarding capacity mechanisms. It comprises realistic modeling of investor behavior
and a broad range of features including an extended time horizon, all major generation
technologies, ramping constraints, strategic behavior, and price elasticity of demand.
We apply the model to the GB case, where the introduction of a capacity market is
ongoing. We find that a capacity market increases reliability. The results of this case
study also suggest that capacity markets can decrease the long-term bill of generation
because, through deliberate overcapacity, they prevent loss of load occasions and reduce
strategic bidding. Hence, we find that capacity markets can lower the wholesale electricity
price and can decrease price volatility. Our findings apply to a market where strategic
bidding is present and the results are based on the assumption that strategic bidding can
mostly be omitted in a capacity market. We discuss why these are reasonable assumptions,
however, we see potential for further research on the extent of strategic behavior in the GB
energy-only and capacity market, which is not the focus of this study. Additionally, we
compare a capacity market that remunerates new capacity only to one that compensates
new and existing capacity. We show that a capacity market for new capacity is only cheaper
because it remunerates fewer generators in the beginning. However, there is a significant
downside of such an unequal treatment that should be considered when deciding on the
design option.
We propose to include additional features in a model similar model, such as stochas-
ticity of conventional plant outages as well as of RES feed-in, grid constraints, and inter-
connections to neighboring countries. Apart from these specific features, it would also be
desirable to compare the presented model with other methods such as simulation models
or optimization models. By doing so, one could examine the quality of obtained results,
range of features, and usability of these different methods for policy assessment. Finally,
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we suggest assessing other design options of capacity mechanisms (e.g., technology-focused
capacity markets or strategic reserves) with a quantitative model presented here. This
could help regulators and market participants to make well informed decisions on future
policies and long-term investments.
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List of symbols
Symbol Description Symbol Description
α Weighting factor of last period against last iteration ξ Availability
β Price elasticity of demand Π Profit
Γ Divestment threshold %d Ramp down factor
ηCO2 CO2 emission intensity %u Ramp up factor
ηfuel Fuel intensity φ Reserve margin
κ Utilization ω Price markup
µ Convergence threshold
Table 4: List of symbols (Greek characters)
Symbol Description Symbol Description
BCM Capacity market bid it Index for iteration
BEl Electricity market bid K0 Initial capacity
bmax Maximum buildup Kavail Available capacity
CC Capital costs Kdisp Dispatched capacity
CCy Cycling costs Kdisp,REN Capacity of dispatched RES
CF Fixed costs LF Economic lifetime of plants
CM Marginal costs n Index for new plants
CM−other Other marginal costs NPV NPV of possible new investments
CTot Total cost Pel Electricity price
D Total demand Q Size of plants
DCONV Conventional demand r Plant specific discount rate
DEL Electricity demand SC Screening curve
e Index for existing plants T Number of years considered
G Number of generation technologies t Index for year
g Index for generation technology U0 Initial number of plants
h Index for hour V OLL Value of lost load
Table 5: List of symbols (Arabic characters)
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